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The Week

WITH the surrender of the officers of the mine workers the Government has won a preliminary victory. Final victory, however, will not have been achieved until the mines are producing at maximum capacity, and this can not be expected until the present mood of bitterness has been dispelled by a settlement which the workers can accept as just. The Government has taken the attitude that its action had nothing to do with the merits of the controversy. It was not prejudging the claims of the men for higher wages and shorter hours. It was merely precluding the use of a method that threatened to cut off a prime necessity of industry and of life. That method, however, is the only one by which labor has down to the present been able to compel the consideration of its just claims. Obviously, then, the Government is under a compelling obligation to devise a new method by which the same result can be attained. The Government now offers its good offices to bring about negotiations, but something more is needed than negotiations between two parties, of which the one has been shorn of its strength by the Government's action, while the fighting power of the other remains unimpaired. Suppose that the operators refuse to make a settlement such as the men could have enforced if they had not been enjoined. Will the Government bring them to terms, under the Lever act or any other? It must. Otherwise no protestations of neutrality can absolve it of the charge that it has thrown the nation's sovereignty into the scales on the side of the employers.

MR. Gompers's charge that the Lever Act was never meant to be applied against workers in the case of strikes has been answered by Senator Thomas of Colorado. Mr. Thomas declares that so far as Attorney General Gregory and the Senate Committee were concerned, Mr. Gompers is in error. To prove this, he has read passages from the Congressional Record—showing that when the Lever bill was being debated, an amendment had been introduced, providing that the measure should not apply to labor organizations—and that this amendment has been discarded by the conference committee.

BUT there is one passage from the Congressional Record that Mr. Thomas has apparently forgotten. It may be found on page 5904, 65th Congress, 1st Session—and we believe that it reveals a flagrant want of good faith toward labor on the part of the Wilson administration. Senator Husting, of Wisconsin, is speaking: "I am authorized by the Secretary of Labor, Mr. Wilson, to say that the Administration does not construe this bill as prohibiting strikes and peaceful picketing and will not so construe the bill, and that the Department of Justice does not so construe the bill and will not so construe the bill."—Upon such a breaking of faith rests Mr. Palmer's successful tourney in the courts.

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THE Attorney-General's reply to Mr. Gompers, and to the manifesto of the American Federation of Labor, was a further instance that the right to strike was not at stake in the court proceedings initiated by the government. Nothing that the government had done or intended doing, he said, was designed to destroy that right—"under ordinary industrial conditions." What such conditions are Mr. Palmer himself pointed out, in an earlier statement made at Harrisburg: "While the right to strike in all ordinary industries, under normal circumstances, cannot be denied, there are some callings which are so closely related to the life, liberty and security of the people that the right to strike in those cases must be subordinated to the superior right of the public to enjoy uninterrupted service."

WHAT Mr. Palmer meant, therefore—and here he seemed to be expressing an accepted policy of the Administration—was that an industrial state is too dependent upon the uninterrupted labor of such workmen as miners, railwaymen and transport workers to permit a strike in any of these key industries. Now the right to strike is a precious privilege, the one instrument by which workingmen can bring legitimate grievances to a hearing. And no one can even think of abridging that right without offering special guarantees to the men who lose it. What guarantees did the Administration offer the miners? No guarantees at all. "The merits of the controversy between the operators and the miners," declared Mr. Palmer, "are not involved in the court proceedings at Indianapolis." The Administration, in other words, adopted the dangerous policy of strike prohibition—and refused even to consider "the merits of the controversy" into which it was plunging.

THE report which Mr. Kenyon's committee made to the Senate about the steel strike had a curious reception by the press. The report ran counter to many newspaper theories of the situation. But by judicious selection of the proper passages, and by means of their own headlines ("Kenyon Finds Reds Head Steel Strike," said the Times), the dissenting papers managed once more to identify the strike with the bugaboo of revolution. What, actually, did the report contain? There was, to be sure, a vigorous criticism of Mr. Foster and of other organizers "who have heretofore entertained the most radical and dangerous doctrines." But that was not the only sort of criticism the report contained. Mr. Kenyon's committee made other discoveries as well.

IT found, in the first place, that "laborers in the steel mills had a just complaint relative to the long hours of service on the part of some of them and the right to have that complaint heard by the company. . . . We believe that a large majority of the men actually working in the mill work ten and twelve hours a day." One of the results of these hours is that lack of familiarity with the English language which so many of the newspapers regard as a sign of radicalism. "Men cannot work ten and twelve hours a day and attend classes in night schools," says the Committee's report. "An eight-hour day, with a living wage that will enable men to support their families and bring up their children according to the standards of American life ought to be a cardinal part of our industrial policy, and the sooner the principle is recognized the better it will be for the entire country."

THE Committee does not regard a strike in the steel industry as necessarily unjustified. Strikes, its report declares, "are apparently the only way for labor to secure even its just demands if employers refuse to grant them." Mr. Gary had refused to meet the union leaders. He put that refusal on the ground that in no way did they represent his employees—"though himself conceding," notes the Committee, "that ten to fifteen per cent of the men in the mills were probably unionized. . . . . It seems to us that even this ten or fifteen per cent had the right to select their own representatives and present their grievances—and that they should have been heard."

FINALLY, discussing questions of free speech and fair trial in western Pennsylvania, the Committee plainly states that "The action in many cases has been such as to lead one side of this controversy to the belief that the officers of the law were acting on the side of the steel company. . . . The suppression of frank discussion only serves to accentuate a bad situation. Officials ought not to be permitted to prevent men from meeting to talk over their grievances and presenting to men their arguments in favor of joining the union."—Thus in respect to long hours, lack of machinery for the presentation of grievances, and suppression of free speech—the Senate Committee explicitly supports the three major arguments of the strikers. If the A. F. of L. has harbored certain dangerous radicals, it is the implication of the Committee report that the steel companies and certain state and municipal authorities as well are themselves guilty of what amounts to a dangerous indifference to the legitimate grievances of the strikers.

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THE New York World believes that "there is danger that the well-considered arrests made in many cities Friday night will be confused, in the vicinity of New York, with the local raids under the authority of the Lusk legislative committee twenty-four hours later." The federal agents sought to arrest certain men for definite infractions of the law. The Lusk raiders visited seventy-one places and arrested more than a thousand men—of whom just thirty-five could be held on any legal charge at all. The quarry in this amazing adventure was literature—twenty-five tons of it—which still needs to be translated into English before anyone can tell whether or not it is seditious. The World believes that while search-warrant procedure is entirely legal a search which "incidentally" takes up more than a thousand men is "an outrageous abuse of power."

SENATOR Hitchcock declares that the preamble to the Republican program of reservations, adopted by a vote of 48 to 40, will have the effect of killing the treaty. What the preamble requires, is that the Senate reservations be formally accepted by at least three of the four principal powers before the treaty becomes effective for the United States. Why is this provision objectionable? Because, say some of the Senators, it is unnecessary; no one doubts the ability of the United States to withdraw from the League by vote of Congress, or thinks we could intervene in a foreign war without parliamentary decision. But the Matin, semi-official organ of the French Foreign Office, seems to have had different ideas on those points not more than a week ago. It is better for the country to be certain of its position, at the start, than to assume to be certain, and to be challenged, later on, for its failure to keep the faith.

ON October 18th the Associated Press sent out from Washington this dispatch: " 'The final crash of the Trotzky-Lenin regime may be delayed some weeks, but it is inevitable." Official information received here may be thus summarized on the situation in Russia."—The country needs very much to be told by the Associated Press who does its summarizing for it, and from what source the official information comes. For less than three weeks later the Associated Press reported that "the position of General Yudenitch is considered most critical" and that Denikin's troops had been "compelled to withdraw across the Bug River, leaving behind much booty, war material, and ammunition." The people of the United States have been fooled many times into thinking that the collapse of the Soviet Government was merely a matter of weeks. And they have, as a result of their credulity tended to be more lenient with a policy which brought no peace.

MEANTIME, in the east, Kolchak seems to be having trouble behind his own lines. He has removed his government from Omsk, and the city is to be made a fortress—to hold back the Soviet troops that have lately been advancing at a rate of fifty miles a week. A despatch to the New York Times from Washington asserts that military experts attribute the withdrawal "directly to the recent evacuation of the Czech troops from the Siberian front." This is probably what has happened. Czech troops, and Japanese, have all along been more important to Kolchak than the Russian armies that never materialized. The legend of popular Russian support for Kolchak breaks down most obviously whenever Kolchak is called upon to face a military crisis.

APPARENTLY the border states on the edge of Russia are losing faith in the ability of either Kolchak or Denikin to get to Moscow. There has been a conference at Dorpat, in which Esthonia, Lettland, Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine and Finland were either officially or unofficially represented, and a statement has been issued declaring against intervention in Russian affairs. The Baltic States assert their readiness to enter upon pourparlers with Russia—and ask that the Allied governments "supervise the fulfilment of the treaty should peace be concluded." To the Associated Press the Esthonian Premier declares that it ought to be possible "to bring about an armed truce, somewhat like the state of things existing between the Bolsheviki and Finland at the border."

IT may have been the possibility of a truce between the border states and Russia that prompted Mr. Lloyd George's recent enigmatic speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet. Mr. George declared that he dreaded "an interminable series of swaying campaigns" and—referring to the Prinkipo proposal of last Spring—that he "hoped the time was not far distant when the powers will be able to renew that attempt with better prospects of success." These hints of a new policy do not tally well with the recent statement of a British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that economic pressure would be applied to Russia until the Russian government had changed. But it is quite within the range of possibility that Mr. George is nevertheless experimenting mentally with a new and more successful policy in the East.

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Walter E. Weyl 1873-1919

IN this first moment of sudden loss friends cannot speak adequately of what Walter Weyl has meant to this generation of Americans. He was indeed "Truth's pilgrim at the plough for poor men's sake." With toil and doubt, with quaint humor and a spontaneous welcome for all sorts of human beings, the chief motives of his public work were curiosity and love. He wrote a story book for children and conducted statistical investigations for the Government, and between these two poles of varied personal hospitality and scrupulous scientific accuracy his life moved.

He used to say that he could not dislike anyone he had ever met. His anger dissolved into a kind of fascinated understanding. He had no personal opponents. The heathen might rage, but what interested him was how perfect a heathen the heathen was. His method was to comprehend, no matter where it led him. He asked questions and he explained, and always when he honestly could, he gave the benefit of the doubt. That is what we who were his friends are remembering to-day. The movements with which he is associated as critic and prophet have already made their own what Walter Weyl taught. But we are thinking of himself, of the man we knew so well and worked with so happily. We are saying good-bye to him, our friend.

Labor in Politics

SOME political cartoonist with a lively imagination would do well to sketch in a series of drawings what the good conservative American labor leader is now thinking about. For he is certainly undergoing an intensive process of thought which would do credit to Rodin's statue. He is angry. He is alarmed. He is staggered. He is puzzled. He is thwarted. The event has proved to be so different from his anticipations. During the war he cooperated loyally with the government, and the government returned the compliment by practically incorporating the American Federation of Labor into the industrial organization of the country. Its representatives sat on the important national commissions. They were sent abroad on many official errands. They were asked to use and they did use all their influence to persuade their fellow-unionists to increase the speed and the volume of production. They naturally expected that after the war was over the government and their employers would show a new and more considerate spirit in dealing with organized labor. They hoped for a comprehensive agreement which would recognize trade-union standards of hours and wages, provide for collective bargaining and in effect give to the American Federation of Labor a function in the organization of American industry during peace similar to that which it obtained during war. Instead they find just one year after the end of the fighting that the employing group, assisted by the government, by the press and by public opinion, has not only refused to regularize their war status but has so far as possible pushed them back into their former position of a half-outlawed group of conspirators against industrial public peace.

In the meantime nothing has happened which from their point of view justifies their disgrace. The country has, it is true, suffered from a species of labor revolt. Hundreds of authorized and many unauthorized strikes have occurred. The granting of the demands which occasioned these strikes might in certain cases have worked injurious results on American business. Organized labor showed signs of being unruly and of drifting in the direction of an increased radicalism. But the conservative labor leader considered these developments as an additional reason for standing by him rather than for repudiating him. He was doing his best to put an end to unauthorized strikes, and to persuade his followers to observe scrupulously their agreements. He was honestly seeking for an operative basis of industrial class cooperation. Towards that end he reduced the demands of labor to the lowest possible point. The employers greeted his proposals with a flat refusal. They would not agree to give union standards of hours and wages and shop conditions any presumptive authority as the beginning of a code of industrial law. They would not recognize any obligation to confer with the representatives of unionized labor. They insisted upon keeping every shop and, so far as possible, every individual employer and employee a law unto themselves. They would not agree to the establishment of any order in industry except one derived from their own undisputed dominion. The effect and the object of this policy was to discredit the influence of the conservative labor leader with his own people. He could not obtain for them by conference any of the concessions for which organized labor in all countries has always contended as essential to its survival. The employers as a group robbed him of every argument which he might have used with his followers to convince them that negotiation was a more dependable instrument than the strike. And in his hour of need the government

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which leaned on him during the war has not only refused to assist him in keeping its own policy alive during peace, but has in at least one flagrant instance used its influence to increase his discredit.

What are the conclusions which the conservative labor leader will draw from his discomfiture? He clearly sees, of course, what an absurd mistake he made in expecting to obtain from the employing group as the result of voluntary agreement the concession of an independent collective status for organized labor and any regularization of its position. The employers are standing pat. They intend, if necessary, to bet so high on their concealed hand that labor under the rules of an unlimited game cannot call for a show-down. The "Public" is indifferent to the merits of the contest. It wants peace at any price. The government represents the "Public." Labor on its side cannot stand pat. Under the existing distribution of economic power it is necessarily the aggressor, and as the aggressor it is a disturber of the peace. Whenever labor has a good hand and is able to bet high, it becomes more than ever a disturber of the peace. It is more than ever possible to represent its demands and any ability it may have to enforce them is an anti-social demonstration of class power. The conservative labor leader is, consequently, bound to infer that the cards are stacked against him. Or what amounts to the same thing, the rules favor his adversary. He cannot obtain any reasonable and definite agreement as the result of negotiation. Unless he is to quit he must fall back on demonstrable power. But when he builds up a formidable power and uses it to insist on negotiation, as the miners have done, they pull the authority of the state on him and prevent a final show-down. What's the answer?

The answer returned by a large and growing faction among the labor unionists is, of course, the obvious one of meeting power with power. If the employing group refuse to grant as the result of negotiation that minimum amount of recognition which is indispensable to the incorporation of labor unions into the structure of industrial society, it leaves to the conservative unionists only two possible alternatives. One is to accept the challenge, to consolidate and extend the power of organized labor, and to strike in every trade and on every favorable opportunity until the employers are convinced of the impossibility of conducting American industry without the consent of their organized employees. The other is to quit and to abandon the leadership of the American labor movement to revolutionary agitators. The second of these alternatives is unthinkable. The majority of labor unionists are loyal American citizens and they will not allow the Garys and the Palmers to transform them into supporters of an irreconcilable class conflict. They must consequently fight. They must in the first place consolidate and increase the strength of organized labor until, as Mr. Gompers said recently, the employing group come to them and implore them to adopt the principle of negotiation and of union standards of hours and labor as the basis of industrial class cooperation. But at the same time they must beware of following the vicious example of the employing group, of yielding to the dangerous and tempting psychology of industrial class warfare. They will have enlisted for a prolonged and troubled contest in which, no matter how little they deserve the accusation, their adversaries will accuse them of being the enemies of society. Their most efficient weapon, that of the strike, is a clumsy and a dangerous instrument. If they fail to use it circumspectly and skillfully they may work more damage on the future welfare of the American people than they do benefit to their own cause. They may through the force of circumstances and as a consequence of the unscrupulous abuse of their opponents drift into closer association with revolutionary agitation than they themselves intend or approve. It is necessary for them to adopt precautions against the danger. They are the only important group in America which is remaining true to the national traditions of fair play, free discussion and government by the consent of the governed. As good Americans they have on their hands two fights instead of one. It is as much their business to provide the American worker with a hopeful and a realistic alternative to revolutionary socialism as it is to lead and organize his resistance to the bourbonism of the existing industrial autocracy.

Surely there is just one effective and provident course for American labor to adopt in order to meet this two-fold irresponsibility and put up a winning fight on both fronts against such fanatical enemies. Without diminishing their effort to consolidate and extend their union membership and without flinching from a determination to use the strike, they should supplement direct action with political agitation. The time has come for them to go into politics and by attempting to form a national political party to assume the responsibility for adapting their class program and needs to those of other classes and to that of the community as a whole. Unless they consciously assume this responsibility the circumstances of the contest and the self-righteous arrogance of the employing group will almost certainly provoke them to fall back on strikes and direct action for the attainment of political as well as industrial purposes. Their industrial program

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necessarily involves legislation which they cannot obtain except as a result either of political agitation or of revolutionary violence. It is absurd for them to fight for higher money wages only to have the benefit taken away from them by the steadily increasing cost of living. The higher standards which they are working to bring about in the conditions of labor employment are difficult to impose upon such disorganized industries as transportation and coal mining. In these and many other cases the improvement of labor standards is inseparably associated with the adoption by the government and the industries of the country of some plan for transforming them into public services. That is the indispensable accompaniment needed to the transformation of labor itself by hand and brain into a public service. Labor needs the assistance of the state. Yet the workers cannot obtain the assistance of the state as long as they allow the politicians, the lawyers and the business men who control the two existing parties to cast their ballots in favor of candidates and platforms which ignore the need of associating the reorganization of industry with the demand made on labor for increasing production.

The decision to go into politics would mean the reversal of a policy which the American Federation of Labor has since its very beginning resolutely and systematically pursued. That is one reason why the conservative labor leaders, associated with that organization, are puzzled and distressed as well as frustrated by their recent discomfiture. They feel the gathering momentum of the movement towards political action among their own followers. They must understand how completely their past policy of realizing the political purposes of organized labor by bringing pressure to bear on one or other of the existing parties has failed. The one conspicuous achievement of that policy, the labor provision of the Clayton act, has turned out to be the most perfect example of a gold brick ever passed off by politicians on a group of credulous victims. It is dawning on them that unless they assume the leadership of a labor party they may cease to be labor leaders of any kind. They are profoundly reluctant to accept the necessity of political action on the part of labor and to put themselves at the head of it, for they are trained in another school and the qualities and equipment needed for political agitation and organization differ in certain respects from the qualities and equipment needed for the management of trade-unions. But they really have no choice. By its course in the miners' strike the government has committed itself to an anti-union policy. Its industrial legislation will during the next ten years re-act decisively upon the ability of organized labor to assist the workers in obtaining a higher standard of living and an independent position in the industrial structure. They cannot allow the government to remain in the complete control of their opponents. They cannot try to take that control away from their opponents by direct action without shaking society to its foundations and skirting the ragged edge of revolution. Their only possible course as loyal American citizens of the working class is to seek a better balance of class political power by organizing a political party which will revive the traditional American faith in progressive legislation and in orderly economic reconstruction as the promoters rather than the stumbling blocks to American national unity.

The Massachusetts Mandate

IF any one were to take at its face value the interpretation put upon the Massachusetts election he would be forced to conclude that there are not two voters in favor of law and order to every voter in favor of lawlessness and disorder; that nearly two hundred thousand men in Massachusetts out of five hundred thousand are in favor of the downfall of American institutions; that if only sixty-five thousand votes had been different orderly government would be destroyed. This is the terrible conclusion, once, we admit with Mr. Wilson that all good Americans voted for Coolidge.

Surely matters are not so bad as that. Two hundred thousand people did not vote for Coolidge; does this mean then that two hundred thousand men voted for revolution? The figures do not support the claim. In 1917 McCall (Rep.) was 90,000 ahead of Mansfield (Dem.); Coolidge (Rep.) is 125,000 ahead of Long (Dem.). Mansfield received about 136,000 Democratic votes, Long received 193,000 Democratic votes. McCall defeated Mansfield in a ratio of 23 to 14 or a little over 3 to 2; Coolidge defeated Long in a ratio of 32 to 19 or above 1.7 to 1. Coolidge receives about 92,000 more than McCall; Long receives about 57,000 more than Mansfield.

Since 1911 there never have been less than 200,000 Republican votes (counting in a fraction of the Bull Moose vote of 1912 and 1913). Long is 18,000 better than the average. Since 1900 the Republican average is 223,000. Coolidge is 95,000 better than the average.

But the comparison with last year is really striking. Coolidge has added 104,000 to his 1918 vote. Long has subtracted 4,000. The total vote is just 100,000 greater and Coolidge has all of it. There

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lies the real significance of the election. Long's vote is more or less normal in size. But Coolidge's vote is triumphantly large. The election elicited a vote as large as that for the Presidency in 1916 (Total 1916, 517,000 for two parties as against 511,000 in 1919), and that whole additional vote went to him. One hundred thousand voters in Massachusetts have to be very much interested before they will go to the polls. Coolidge's victory is just equivalent to this "silent vote."

This does not mean that the same 100,000 who never vote except when they are thoroughly stirred all emerged from retirement and voted for Coolidge. We know that many Democrats voted Republican this year; therefore we must also conclude that many Republicans voted Democratic. But the sum of the silent votes and of the voters who cut their tickets both ways constitutes the vote that gave the election its character.

In speaking of the result of an election, the word "issue" has two meanings. For the regular voters the issue is the campaign cry under which they vote the ticket they have always voted. For a small number the "issue" is the reason why they vote one ticket rather than another. These latter may in Massachusetts by an extremely generous estimate be 100,000. If we cancel out those normal Republicans who voted for Long because they liked what he said about trade unions or the Irish Republic or the League of Nations against those silent voters who, when they vote at all, vote Republican, we still find about 100,000 voters on a generous estimate who rose and voted for Coolidge purely on the issue of law and order.

All the other Republicans were no doubt in favor of law and order too, but they would have voted Republican had the police strike never taken place. Does this mean that nearly two hundred thousand voted Democratic against law and order? Obviously not. The bulk of them were regular Democrats; others were convinced that there was no issue of law and order between Coolidge and Long; others thought that the Coolidge backers were exploiting law and order to have a whack at labor; others voted for an Irish Republic, or against Mr. Wilson, or for any one of the thousand other things that decide the vote of the sovereign people. Massachusetts is not more than one-third revolutionary. Massachusetts: there she stands a great deal safer than the current interpretation allows.

The 100,000, who constitute the independent "law and order" vote, are the interesting people in the election. That figure is in our opinion too high because it does not allow for the nation-wide drift towards Republicanism. But there is no way of correcting it. So for the purpose of the argument it may stand. 100,000 people in Massachusetts either took the trouble to vote or the greater trouble of switching their vote in order to register their support for law and order.

Their vote was an act of devotion. In a world shaken by anarchy, at a time when Americans have allowed themselves to doubt the stability of their basic institutions, these voters were told that they had in Coolidge an opportunity to affirm publicly and dramatically a faith in orderly government. It did not matter whether orderly government was in fact challenged by Mr. Long. It was unequivocally symbolized for them by Mr. Coolidge. They desired an opportunity to renew their allegiance and they found it at the ballot-box. Those who needed to be reassured have therefore every reason to be reassured. They can be reassured by the vote for Coolidge, and they can be reassured no less by the overwhelming bulk of the vote for Long.

The result proves what every person who is not hysterical knew. It proves that the typical American electorate is not tempted by lawlessness and disorder. The demonstration is complete and ought to be convincing. If the excited people were sincerely interested in law and order, they would now settle down confidently to work out in an intelligent and progressive and humane spirit the problems which press upon the nation. But they show no sign of doing that. On the contrary they are proposing to take the Massachusetts election as a mandate for the exploitation of their own hobbies. They have a certain justification for this. Elections are very simple and rough decisions. They are for "law and order," say; the next step is for the demagogues to call anything they wish to do law and order. If they call it law and order loud enough and long enough, and churn up the headlines sufficiently, they can for quite some time persuade the men who have thirty minutes a day on the street car to give to public affairs that they are the only authentic Americans in the land. They can do it until they have obstructed and obfuscated things to a point where the man in the cars begins to notice that he has been made game of.

The election is a blank check for law and order. How much real law and real order it will produce depends upon who fills out the blank. For as Theodore Roosevelt once remarked to an editor of this paper: "You must have law and order, but you can have law and order as in Warsaw." And he added of a certain well known reactionary that he was "so wicked he would embrace a good principle" if it helped him. These warnings are signif-

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icant, not in connection with what happened in Massachusetts, but with what all sorts of interested parties are pretending there happened.

For there are two sorts of people in America who talk about law and order. The first kind is symbolized by Mr. Gary. In the name of law it will violate law, be it the anti-trust act, or the constitution of Pennsylvania, or the constitution of the United States. It will play Shylock with the coal miners under a war-emergency act, and demand the liberties of peace for the coal operators. It will deny the steel strikers the protection of the law as to freedom of speech and assembly, and it will permit the organ of the coal operators to incite to lawbreaking without a word of protest. It will coerce coal miners who ask for negotiation in accordance with the ancient practice of the coal industry, and it will not coerce Mr. Gary who declines all negotiations whatsoever. It will incite lawless war against Russia, be complacent while Americans went to their death in a war which had no standing in international law, it will support a blockade for which there is not the vestige of legal authority, and it will take the most light hearted view of national honor under the legal contract entered into by the armistice. That is one view of law and order.

The other view maintains that permanent order depends upon the faithful administration of laws progressively adapted to the needs of the community. It does not countenance the evasion even of an unjust law. But it strives for the alteration of such a law. It insists that if the constitution guarantees freedom of speech that freedom shall be as scrupulously observed as the clauses which protect property. It denounces as the very soul of lawlessness the temper of mind which is content to enforce only the temporarily convenient sections of the law. It asserts that if the Fourteenth Amendment is necessary to private property, the First Amendment is necessary to human liberty. To the gentlemen who insist on the Fourteenth Amendment and ignore the First Amendment it argues that they have no more right to proclaim themselves exponents of law and order than a smuggler has to announce himself a free trader.

This is the danger signal raised by the Massachusetts election. The mandate for "law and order" exists. The question is whether the leaders of the community, and above all the editors of newspapers, are to take that mandate as an excuse for Garyism, or as the opportunity to press resolutely for that antithesis of Gary's lawlessness and disorder which in calmer days most men would have recognized as Americanism.

Guaranteeing Railroad Profits

IT would be difficult to conceive of a more dangerous policy than that recommended by Senator Cummins and the Congressional leaders in charge of railroad legislation. Confessing that permanent legislation probably cannot be put through before the railroads are returned to private ownership, they suggest that an interim bill be enacted. The proposal appears to be that the railroads be turned back to private operation on January 1, that their expenditures, their labor policy, their traffic policy, should revert under the control of private boards of directors and operating staffs, but that the Government should for a period of six months continue the guarantee of net earnings which was in effect during the war.

The consequences of such an enactment can be imagined. To guarantee net earnings, and at the same time relinquish control over expenditures, will open the way to frauds and speculations on a gigantic scale. During the war the Government guaranteed to the farmers a minimum price for wheat. One can imagine the outcry if a farmers' organization had asked the Government to guarantee not the price but the net profits from wheat, without controlling the amount of work the farmer did or the amount of money he spent.

Of course it may be assumed that Congress will try to protect the Treasury by placing limits on the amount to be charged against operating expenses, although press reports have suggested no such attempt. The Cummins bill, as reported from the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee on October 23 contained a temporary guarantee clause, with a proviso that maintenance expenditures shall not exceed those provided for in the standard contract, and that if the Interstate Commerce Committee finds that other operating expenses are "clearly abnormal for any month" it shall have power to direct a "restatement" of the expenses for that month. The construction of the proviso is enveloped in a haze of ambiguity, and even if it means what the draftsmen apparently intended it to mean, it will fall far short of protecting the Treasury. No amount of periodical examination of accounts by an overworked and unwieldly regulating commission can prevent that steady deterioration in operating efficiency, that inevitable laxness in expenditure, which is certain to ensue where profits are guaranteed. Nothing short of continuous administrative supervision by an executive body charged with full responsibility for the results of railroad operation—in other words, nothing short of a prolongation of federal control—can be a fair

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and adequate substitute for the profit incentive.

The return of the railroads to private operation will be an unscrambling process on a gigantic scale. During the war, the railroads formed one operating unit. Traffic was routed over the lines that could carry it the most economically. Competitive circuitous routing, and the waste of traffic rivalry and solicitation, were largely eliminated. On January 1st competition will be restored. The railroads will be under private control, and their profits will once more depend on the amount of traffic they can wrest away from their competitors. The effect of the Cummins proposal will be that for six months the railroads can throw upon the public the costs of these wasteful competitive expenditures. They can temporarily lower rates on competitive commodities, and charge the loss to the Government. They can offer valuable free services, as a means of inducing shippers to patronize their lines, and recoup the expense out of the federal guarantee. They can indulge in a competitive orgy at Government expense.

When the Government relinquishes control of the railroads, it relinquishes control over their labor policies. It is quite apparent to any one who has watched recent developments that the labor situation on the railroads is extremely precarious. Large wage demands are pending, and have been held in abeyance only because of the Government's unfulfilled promise to bring about a substantial reduction in the cost of living. In addition there is the dangerous element of restlessness due to labor's distrust of the private corporations into whose hands they are to be delivered on January 1st. On the other hand the action of the employers in the steel and coal industries gives some ground for the suspicion that capital recognizes that the time is auspicious to force a showdown with labor, and crush labor organizations while the present public attitude of hysteria and panic prevails. Suppose that soon after January 1st a railroad strike is provoked by some of the more unscrupulous of the railroad employers, just as the Steel Corporation provoked the steel strike. Suppose that the railroad officials decline to negotiate or arbitrate, just as the Steel Corporation declined to negotiate or arbitrate. However wrong the employers may be, however they may flout the sentiment of the country, the honor of the United States will stand pledged to hold them financially harmless from the effects of the strike for a period of six months. With no control over their policies, the Government will be giving them a blank check to use as they please in their fight with the unions.

One may sympathize with the Congressional leaders for the dilemna in which they find themselves. To legislate is impossible. To allow the railroads to go back without legislation means financial chaos. To keep the roads under federal control is to acknowledge that ten months ago Mr. McAdoo was right in advising them to extend federal control, and they were wrong in rejecting his advice. To turn the railroads back with a guarantee seems simple. It is the line of least resistance. But it is worth remembering that if the Cummins proposal is put through, the revelations of graft and extravagance at Government expense will begin to see the light just as the next presidential campaign begins to warm up, and that as likely as not they will be of a character seriously to injure the political reputation of any man who now actively supports the policy of relinquishing control of the railroads and guaranteeing their profits.

The Russian Blockade

FORTY thousand men, women and children in Petrograd starved to death during the late fiasco of General Yudenitch. So it was triumphantly reported by the blockade supporting press. Whether the statement was true or not we have no means of knowing. It is conceived to be good tactics to create in the minds of the people the impression that the blockade is effective. The blockade is meant to kill. It does kill, principally the people for whose liberation our governments are so deeply concerned. It does liberate, finally, after prolonged agony, if by liberation you mean death. At Viborg, across the Gulf of Finland, less than a hundred miles away, are stores of American food sufficient to provision Petrograd for a month. It is officially promised that those stores will become available when the process of liberation has been completed.

Let us not exaggerate the importance of forty thousand lives snuffed out in Petrograd in consequence of one more futile adventure in Allied strategy. Immensely greater is the volume of suffering endured throughout Soviet Russia week after week, month after month, by the exclusion from Soviet territory of food supplies which the Russians could afford to buy, of clothing and the raw materials of clothing manufacture, of medical supplies and surgical apparatus. What no civilized individual would deny to his bitterest enemy, the civilized nations of America, England and France are denying to the whole Russian people, young and old, innocent and guilty, especially the innocent.

But does the guilt rest with the nations of America, France and England? In what single case have the democracies of the three peoples given their

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assent to the blockade of Russia? In none, it must be admitted. The men who have arrogated to themselves the power to strangle the Russian people have never had a mandate for such a policy. They were endowed with certain extraordinary powers for the conducting of the war against Germany. It was no part of their competence to determine what kind of government should be maintained on the soil of a nation once allied, then neutral and never in any honest sense of the term, enemy. Those powers have been diverted to an alien purpose. Where then is our complicity, as private citizens who have never been consulted, whose consent has never been sought? Our complicity consists in our complacency. Our governments would not dare to persist in a policy of wholesale destruction of civilian lives if our peoples had preserved the same keen sense of international justice that ranged the whole democratic world against Germany.

We pretend to view with grave concern such industrial disturbances as railway strikes and coal strikes, because they inflict hardships not only upon the parties to the controversy, who have elected to fight out their differences, but upon the general public, which had no share in creating the grievances to be adjusted. What then must be our natural attitude toward an international policy that in effect selects out the innocent members of a people for actual starvation, in the forlorn hope that in their helpless agony they may be willing and able to turn upon the members we conceive to be guilty? It is known to everybody that the blockade is not depriving the Red army of food and clothing. It is not only known to everybody but acknowledged by the governments. In his defence of the blockade policy Assistant Secretary of State Phillips points out that the Red army ration is three times that of the average civilian. Of course. So was the German army ration about three times as liberal as the civilian ration. The blockade of Germany did not starve the army but the people. And there was not a humane British leader who did not regret this incidence of the blockade. It could be justified only on the ground that Britain was fighting for her life against an enemy which would stick at no means of wreaking injury. Even so, the justification would have seemed inadequate to civilized men if there had not been clear grounds for believing that the civilian suffering would bring a collapse of the German political machine and an end of the war.

Are we fighting for our lives against Russia? That seems to be the understanding of Assistant Secretary Phillips. The Bolsheviki have gold; they would like to overturn our government; they might succeed if we permitted them to exchange the gold for commodities the Russian people need. Is it conceivable that any responsible man should hold American institutions in such contempt as seriously to entertain the notion that a little gold paid out to a few propagandists could menace their stability? It is not conceivable to us. An elephant may run amuck through fear of a mouse; but this is not the present condition of mind in our government. Apparently we have made secret commitments to foreign governments that have made secret commitments to God knows what. And we are putting the best face on a bad matter by alleging fears that no one in his senses actually experiences.

We are confronted with no menace to our own national safety that would for a moment justify us in grasping at such an inhuman weapon as a blockade. We are actuated solely by a desire to compel one internal regime in Russia to give way to another, and as we believe, a better. We are setting a precedent for meddling without limit in the affairs of other peoples, as if we had attained to a perfection in our own affairs. Grant that the purpose is worthy: the policy is none the less pernicious unless it can be crowned with speedy success. Now, what prospect is there that our blockade will quickly overturn the Soviet government? Yudenitch is trying to extricate himself from his movement against Petrograd. Kolchak is removing his headquarters eastward. Denikin has come to a halt, and even the most enthusiastic interventionist military critics are postponing their hopes to another season. Another season; but in the next six months, many hundreds of thousands of Russian women and children will be thrust into their graves by our stubborn adherence to a fear created by our own official propaganda, to a hope born of ignorance of Russia and revolution.

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EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY — WALTER LIPPMANN
FRANCIS HACKETT — PHILIP LITTELL
ALVIN JOHNSON — CHARLES MERZ
SIGNE TOKSVIG, Assistant Editor

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The Debacle of Archangel

IN August, 1918, several large transports loaded with troops and accompanied by units of the fleet, steamed into the White Sea and cautiously pulled up to the Archangel docks. The Bolsheviki had known in advance that they were coming and why, and by great industry had succeeded in removing by railroad and river practically all the stores which the troops had been told they were coming there to guard. These goods were sent to points far enough south to be secure for the future uses of the Soviet government. As these stately ships rode into the mouth of the Dvina River the train bearing the last of the Bolshevik officials pulled out of the Archangel station and North Russia was in a state of war.

The war began promptly. We had been sent to guard stores. For six months we were referred to at home as "guarding stores at Archangel." The stores had been taken by friends of Germany. We must pursue this enemy. We did. We did not get him, nor the stores, and the early Russian winter came and found us thrown out to seven points in a form that was like a seven-fingered hand with one finger three hundred miles long and with no lateral communication between the fingers. In driving these lines out we lost men, and learned a little about our unknown enemy, but we did not lose heart nor did we learn anything about the big problems of winter campaigning in Russia. We waited to learn this by experience.

It was a British show. The British were in command—absolute command, of course. Perhaps the War Department knows how much they took counsel with the American senior command. Perhaps it does not matter. (But this would be of great interest to the American soldiers who were here.) It was British responsibility to decide where we should stand, when we should move and who should do what.

The winter was spent almost wholly on the defensive. The Bolsheviki gathered themselves together in considerable numbers. Having all those precious stores, rifles, artillery, ammunition and all the needful implements they attacked, always with greatly superior numbers and with a decided gun superiority. They drove us back some because they had us outranged in artillery. They gave us cause to respect their military sagacity and fighting qualities. But we punished them so severely that they found their gains fearfully expensive. Still they did gain, and it was not an idle boast that they would drive us into the White Sea by summer.

We whipped them in every fight. But I write these lines in the smoking room of a great British liner in the White Sea, and there are many more liners here, and we are getting away as fast as we can, and all those old positions we fought for so well are in the hands of the Bolsheviki, who have never won a single battle.

There are causes that led to this which are quite as important and decisive as the issue of battles. The first of these was poor management. By this I do not refer to military technique, nor am I simply reiterating the stereotyped growl of the growsing soldier. This expedition called for more than military skill.

There was utter failure to realize that an expedition of this sort is bound to run into social and political problems that are quite as important, perhaps more so, than mere military practice. The management of this campaign has ignored all social and political considerations that might have contributed to its success or failure and has blundered stupidly whenever these matters have forced themselves to the front. And the military blunders have been so obvious that they have been openly acknowledged in part and are on record in the war office today.

There is direct connection between this and the second cause of failure which was antagonism to the campaign on the part of the soldiers. I do not say loss of morale, because the term would be misunderstood. Our men fought. Our infantry never lost a foot of ground. But they hated the fight, they resented fighting without a cause.

I made a trip in December speaking to the men in their billets and the Y. M. C. A. huts over a stretch of 500 versts. Everywhere, on every occasion, I was asked persistently and importunately, "What are we here for?"

"The armistice is signed. Why are we fighting?"

"Did they forget about us in Paris?"

"We don't want Russia. What have we against the Bolsheviki?" Of course I tried to answer these questions, but I found it easier to convince myself than I did to convince the men. They were not convinced that I knew. The American and Canadian troops were particularly outspoken in their resentment at being at war in a futile fight against nobody and for nothing in particular when the rest of the world had stopped fighting.

A real cause of this grand debacle therefore was the silence of our governments. I could not answer their questions. Nobody who came to them could answer their questions. The government apparently

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would not. Why would not the government speak?

When I first came to Archangel there was in all people a wonderful faith in Mr. Wilson. I marvelled how all these Russians could have learned so much about him. They knew what he had said. They knew what he stood for before the world. I wondered if the people at home knew as well. Pictures of the American President soon made their appearance and were given great prominence throughout the city, and in every village. I was calling on the editor of a Russian newspaper one day. He could use a few English words and I a few Russian. Mr. Wilson's picture hung over his desk. "The friend of the Russian people," he said, pointing to the picture, and as he looked at it tears slowly gathered. Turning toward me he said brokenly, "He is the one man in all the world who can lead Russia out of her troubles." And I gathered that the reason for this faith was in part because the Bolsheviki respected and feared Mr. Wilson. This man was on the Bolshevik black list. His paper was radically socialistic, however, and the editor was quite distrustful of the results of the Allied expedition. But he believed in Mr. Wilson. "He will soon speak," he said, "and then all Russia will follow him."

That was last December. In June I met this editor in Archangel. His home and printing plant had long been in the hands of the Bolsheviki. There was pathetic sadness in his face as he told me of the universal hopelessness of the people. I boomed the League of Nations. It would cure the wrongs, it would become the guide and instrument of salvation. But there was no response of hope. "We have lost Mr. Wilson and there is no hope. But after we are all killed off in this mad and hopeless struggle, Russia will rise out of the ruins and show the way of real democracy."

In May General Miller, the Russian commander at Archangel, issued a proclamation calling upon all people of Bolshevist sympathies to leave Archangel within a prescribed time, offering them transport to the Bolshevik lines and two days rations, and threatening severe penalties to all who failed to go. This was startling. All the Bolsheviks had left when we came in. None had been permitted to come in since the campaign began. Where then did these come from who were reported officially as being in Archangel in "large numbers"? The obvious answer is the correct one. They had developed Bolshevik sympathies in Archangel. Some of them took their two days rations and crossed the line, the Russian command ordered quite a number of them shot, but others kept springing from the ground until the British command had ample ground for its theory that if you scratch a Russian you find a Bolshevik.

These numerous Bolsheviki were made in Archangel. They were made by the British militarists, the Russian monarchists and the Bolshevik propagandists.

Archangel was under the Tschaikowsky government when we arrived. It was composed of truly democratic men, but it was not a democratic government. It was the creature of the Military Intervention. These democratic men had asked for the intervention but they had trouble with it almost at once and before the armistice was signed were sick of their bargain.

The military were equally sick of theirs. They did not come to Archangel to set up a democracy nor to encourage socialism nor to listen to theories. They came to fight the plans of Germany, to fight the Bolshevik, "to guard stores at Archangel." Beyond this the military mind goeth not. So the venerable Tschaikowsky was gradually put aside and ignored while a Russian military government grew up under the aegis of the Military Intervention, composed of monarchists and military men of the old school who were far more to the taste of the Military Intervention.

The working people and peasants understood that Tschaikowsky in whom they believed, was only a figure-head and scarcely that, while the old regime began to rear its head portentously. They understood too that the Military Intervention liked the monarchists, took them into their confidence, had them to dinner, danced with them. Gradually they came to believe that with America out the Military Intervention would set up a Tsar. The making of Bolsheviki in Archangel has not proceeded according to the pet American theory of Bolshevist-making. They have not been made by hunger. Archangel has been fed. Not by charity, but by work. Plenty of work, fair pay, and ample supplies.

The first great step in the process of making Bolsheviki was the conscription of men for the army. This was not done until ample opportunity had been given everybody to enlist voluntarily, but not everybody volunteered. The Russian point of view and ours were quite different in this matter. We had undertaken to fight the Bolsheviki for him and he was glad to have us do it. Our men and officers, on the other hand, declared it was preposterous to suppose they were going to do this fighting while the "lazy Russians stayed at home." So conscription went into force. At first a small class of young men, then a larger class, and finally practically every able bodied man from 17 to 50. Here was another story. Here was war, real war, again. The new thing called Military Intervention or Allied Assistance or anything else had proved to be the old thing that Russia knew so well. And the peasant of North Russia did not want it. As

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early as January some of these conscripted companies at Shenkursk went over bodily to the Bolsheviki.

The suppression of all expressions of interest in Russia's "new-found freedom" was a stupid blunder. There were no public meetings, no open discussion of political questions, no real freedom of the press. The Russian soldiers were even afraid to sing the Marseillaise, and confined themselves to the innocuous if beautiful folksongs of the old regime, leaving all of the many excellent freedom songs of the revolution to the exclusive use of the Bolsheviki. The British never discovered that the Russian loves these freedom songs, because they took counsel solely of the reactionary monarchist element they had placed in power.

I have known a single strain of one of these freedom songs to throw a roomful of people into panic with fear that it meant a fresh revolt. And I have seen a crowd of Russian soldiers respond with keen pleasure when their officer, a friend of mine with whom I had talked the matter over, told them to go ahead and sing the so-called Bolshevik songs. This was toward the end of the chapter of M. I.

The suspension of all kinds of democratic and political experiment and experience by M. I. was a matter of grave consequence. After a year of Military Intervention a member of a Zemstvo upravda said to me, "We have made no progress in government. We have lost ground. It could not have been worse under the Bolsheviki." The people under Military Intervention felt that they were robbed of the freedom they had waited for so long and enjoyed for such a little time. The belief that the Bolsheviki would have robbed them equally or worse comforted them for a time, but this comfort wore away as time stretched on and Military Intervention made constantly increasing demands upon them.

Conscription for the army was accompanied by labor conscription. This was followed by more labor conscription. This labor was employed largely in building something to be blown up, loading cargoes to be reloaded, hauling supplies backward to be hauled forward again and other ostensibly wasteful operations which accompany all military operations, more or less, in this case more. This conscripted and wasted labor was taken away from farm work at times when it could not be spared without the loss of a season's crop. But it had to be done and military necessities do not take farm seasons into account. The Military Intervention had been here all winter and had consumed every bit of the country's surplus. This year there must be a big crop or starvation. It has been a good crop but a small one because of labor conscription. And those "ignorant" peasants can tell you what that means to them with the Military Intervention leaving now, however many useless paper roubles it may leave behind it.

The financial contrivances of the M. I., while conceived with the best of intentions, perhaps, and being presumably in the interests of Russian welfare, created much suspicion and bitterness among the peasants and the soldiers. The country having been flooded with Kerensky and Bolshevik paper money, it was impossible to maintain any value, so a new rouble was issued called the "English rouble," with a guaranteed minimum value based on deposits of securities with the Bank of England. But the peasants were not interested. They did not give up their old roubles for the new. So it became necessary to force matters. A schedule of depreciation of all old roubles was published. While the English roubles stood as guaranteed at 40 to the pound all old or "Russian" money, as the peasants called it, stepped down a ladder of fortnightly rung from 48 to 56 to 65 to 72 to 80 to 90, after which it was to have no value whatever. It was hoped, of course, that all people would avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered to dispose of their worthless money and the region would have a sound currency of some intranational value as a result.

Then, finding that it had a lot of old roubles on hand, the M. I. paid its Russian soldiers and its civilian labor in these old roubles that it had proposed to put out of circulation, at the same time making it impossible for the holder to spend this money in availing himself of any of the M. I.'s resources.

Dozens of times I have seen Russian soldiers tear up this old money with which they had been paid and throw it on the floor in anger, because they could buy nothing with it.

Yet the old money stayed in circulation. When 80 was reached no attempt was made to press the process of depreciation any further. Old "Nicolai" paper had gone out of circulation, and in the early days of August the peasants generally were preferring old roubles at 80 to new ones at 40. And there was a very general feeling among the Russian people that the M. I. had taken all that value out of their old roubles and in some mysterious way put it into its own pocket.

The execution of suspects made Bolsheviki right and left. The inquisitorial processes of the Russian puppets of the M. I. were necessarily so much like those of the old regime that they went far to dispel all illusions about the Military Intervention that might have remained in the peasant mind.

When night after night the firing squad took out its batches of victims it mattered not that no civil-

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ians were permitted on the streets. There were thousands of listening ears to hear the rat-tat-tat of the machine guns, and no morning paper could have given all the gruesome details more complete circulation than they received in the regular process of universal news gossip by which Archangel keeps itself in up-to-the-minute touch with all local affairs.

The details were well known. Some one had seen it all. Some one also knew who were to be included in the new batch tonight. These little gossip groups discussed freely the merits of the shooting and the charges. The M. I. tried to prevent this but it couldn't. Every victim had friends. These friends and their friends rapidly were made enemies of the M. I. And this enmity naturally spelled Bolshevism, as far as the M. I. was concerned.

I witnessed the anguish of one woman whose husband and father were both in prison as suspects. They had both won honor in the war against Germany. The husband had been wounded. The charges of Bolshevik sympathy on which they were arrested were based on slight evidence. She could not visit them. Only through the underground methods of the native Russians could she learn anything about them. She too listened every night for the rat-tat-tat until she could bear it no longer. So she was arrested a few days before I left Archangel for having said something for which the M. I. could not stand. Another Bolshevik.

If the Russian soldiers whom we organized, equipped and paid to fight the Bolsheviki went over as they did in whole companies to the Bolsheviki it was not because of any lure or reward that our enemies held out to them. It was because we in our stupidity thought of them as "swine" (the favorite appellation for Russians of most British officers) and employed such methods of administration and control in our Military Intervention as they had been only too familiar with in the old days of Tsarism. We failed to win their hearts or their confidence. We destroyed all their illusions about us. And they turned "Bolshevik."

Of course English and American soldiers did not turn Bolshevik, but it was startling sometimes to hear their exclamations of sympathy with the Bolsheviki and their protests against the whole fact and practice of the Military Intervention. This was most common among the Americans and Canadians of the winter army and is almost universal among the new army that came out from England to finish the job. I heard so much of this protest from the new army that I felt at one time they were more likely to make trouble for the Military Intervention than the Russians were.

A gentleman who was very much in sympathy with the Military Intervention was lecturing to an audience of these men one night in Archangel on "Why are we here?" His lecture had been O. K.'d carefully by the Intelligence Department and was considered safe, in fact, most excellent. After the lecture the men were given an opportunity to ask questions, and some of the questions they asked were, "Is England going to take the port of Murmansk?" "Did a British syndicate get control of the lumber industry of Archangel?" "Who cashed in on the new rouble deal?" "Are we trying to set up a monarchy here in Russia?" This from British Tommies was too much. The Intelligence Department sent around word the next morning that this lecture had better not be given any more. What the troops needed was entertainment and amusement.

And then came the mutinies.

Earlier in the year there had been a few small mutinies of conscripted men at Shenkursk, Mourmansk and Toulgas, but the thing that broke loose now was quite another matter. At Troitsa, at Onega, at Pinega, at Oberzerskaya and on the Mourmansk railroad our Russian soldiers mutinied, killed their officers and went over to the Bolsheviki. Then, of course, there was nothing for the British authorities to do but to shoot all other Russian soldiers who were suspected of treason. They did this with a brutality, the details of which I will spare you, but not one item of which escaped the Russian people.

The British wind was up. They were soldiers, and prepared for any fight that might be in store for them. But being shot in bed by your own soldiers is not fighting. It is not war. There was no question of courage involved. The army had courage enough. But this was next to suicide, to go to the front leading traitors.

There was evidence one day on the railroad front that a new mutiny was brewing. All the men of the suspected company were put on a train and then disarmed. A guard went through the train and counted off the men, taking every tenth man outside to be shot without trial. The men had not mutinied, but they might and something had to be done.

I was told about another company of eighty Russians who were under suspicion at the same time. The British officer in command gave them the option of declaring who the ringleaders were or being shot en masse. Under the fear of this threat 15 out of the 80 men were named and shot without trial.

And so there being nothing else possible the debacle began. But it is a big job to get an expedition out of a country, much bigger than to get it in. There are great quantities of munitions and supplies to be transported or destroyed. There are

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fortifications to destroy, bridges to burn, railways to tear up, all fighting facilities to cripple. There are civilians to evacuate, and all the service branches of the army, with their vast and varied stores, to be disposed of. And there is the enemy to be dealt with. The thing simply couldn't be done with any chance of success on all of those long fingers of this expedition until a smashing blow had been delivered to the Bolsheviki, both to reduce their morale and to increase your own, which had been impaired by the Troitsa affair.

So a smashing blow was delivered successfully at one of the fingerpoints, costing us more men than any other fight in North Russia; and instanter the latest retreat from Moscow began. Now there was something quite peculiar about this retreat from the finger points in North Russia. We were not pursued. The Bolsheviki knew we were going. In fact, they seemed to be remarkably well posted as to our plans. They were willing to have us go. But they did not chase us out. The Bolsheviki had little to do with causing this retreat. This retreat was forced by the conscripted soldiers and people of North Russia, who wanted the English to go, and who were so sincere in this that they were willing to face all the dangers of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" commissar, and the unrestrained spite of every personal enemy without English protection. A school teacher whom I knew to be on the Bolshevik blacklist, said to me in July:

"Our duty is to Russia. The Bolsheviki may rule us or may kill us, but our duty is to Russia. The English must go." The Labor Congress assembled at Solombola passed resolutions urging the hasty withdrawal of the British and were at once disbanded by the army and charged with being Bolshevik propagandists.

But the retreat was on. Every embassy received orders from home to leave with all its citizens, bag and baggage, and as I write in these early days of September they are going as from a pestilence, shipload after shipload, the American, the French, Italian, Chinese, Serbian, Japanese embassies, consulates of all sorts, Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., military missions, bourgeois Russians, and any number of enterprising citizens of enterprising countries are getting out—ordered out—forced out.

The Military preceded, accompanied, followed. We hear wild rumors that the Labor Congress continued to meet in spite of the army, that now they have turned upon the Russian military leaders, who are well known to be monarchist in sympathy, and informed them that they must make peace with the Bolsheviki, and that there has been some bad rioting in Solombola. Two British soldiers have been beaten to death in the streets by Russians. More Russians have been shot because they were suspected of Bolshevik sympathies.

As our ships pull out of the harbor great fires break out in the vast lumber yards on both sides of the river, the laborers are of course charged with Bolshevik sabotage, and an enormous pall of black smoke hangs for days over the scene of this most unfortunate expedition, a sinister emblem of the ruin and hatred that lie behind us, and a symbol of angry protest from the sky itself over our stupid failure to understand the Russian people.

RALPH ALBERTSON.

The British Railway Strike

The Wages Question

AFTER the national railway strike in Great Britain had been settled, the tone of the public and conversational comments upon it showed clearly that it was a matter of some doubt on which side the victory lay. The strikers had challenged the Government; and at least equally the Government had challenged the strikers. The Government press spoke of a victory for the forces of law and order: the Labor press was equally insistent upon the triumph won for the workers. The man in the street was perplexed, and emerged in a very confused state of mind from a reading of Lord Northcliffe's Daily Mail and Mr. Lansbury's Daily Herald. The fact is that neither party won a conclusive victory, and that the estimate of the balance of gain to either depends upon our estimate of the causes and of the motives which lay behind the dispute.

Who was the aggressor? That is the first question we must attempt to answer before we can arrive at any real estimate of the importance of the railway strike. Of course, at first sight the railwaymen, who struck and held up the transport of the community, seem to have been the aggressors. But a closer examination of the facts upsets this conclusion. The arguments adduced by the New Statesman and by other journals leave little doubt that the strike was provoked, or at least allowed to happen with little or no effort to prevent it, if not by the Government as a whole, at any rate by powerful forces within the Government, and by still more powerful forces acting upon it from outside. In order to make this plain, it is necessary to set out briefly the facts concerning the present wages situation in Great Britain.

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Like other countries, Great Britain adopted the method of dealing with wages questions during the war on an emergency basis. That is to say, the ordinary methods of collective bargaining largely ceased to operate, a system of compulsory arbitration was introduced in all the war industries, and in nearly all cases, instead of increases in wage-rates, there were granted war advances, based upon the increased cost of living, and possessing validity only for the war period. When hostilities terminated last November, a special act, the Wages (Temporary Regulation) act, was hurriedly passed to keep these war advances in operation for a further six months, and this act was renewed for another six months when it was about to lapse in May of the present year. It should be made plain that this act does not absolutely guarantee the maintenance of war wages; but it enacts that they shall remain in operation as minima unless they are increased or decreased by an award of the Government Court of Arbitration established under the act. In practice, this court has usually maintained the war wages without change. This act does not in practice apply to the railwaymen, who negotiate for themselves directly with the Government; but the same principles actuate the Government in its dealings with the railwaymen as actuate the Court of Arbitration in its dealings with other industries.

When the Wages Temporary Regulation act was passed, employers' associations and trade unions were urged by the Government to utilize the breathing-space afforded by the act for the purpose of meeting together and deciding on the levels of permanent wages for the post-war period in various trades. There are very few cases in which this has been done, and practically none in which it has been done satisfactorily. Usually the meetings between the parties have revealed a wide difference of opinion, the trade unionists contending at the least for the merging of the whole of the war wages into permanent rates, while the employers have desired a much lower permanent wage level, and have contended either that wages must be reduced as the cost of living falls (which it shows no sign of doing at present), or even latterly that wages must first be reduced in order to effect a fall in the cost of living. In case after case, therefore, a deadlock has been reached, and an uneasy modus vivendi has been arrived at by continuing to pay the war wages without prejudice to any future action.

Meanwhile, the railwaymen were negotiating directly with the Government on this very point of wage standardization on a post-war basis. The same gulf was soon revealed. An agreement was arrived at for the drivers and firemen which did secure for these comparatively highly paid workers the retention of the whole of the war wages; but the Government's proposals for the permanent wage-levels for the other grades, which include the vast majority of the railwaymen, fell far short of this, involving reductions in many cases of ten shillings or eleven shillings, and in some of as much as fifteen shillings, on the present wages. This difference is accounted for by the fact that all the war advances have been granted at an equal rate of so many shillings, now thirty-three shillings in all, to all railwaymen, irrespective of their pre-war earnings. Thus one man may have received 150 per cent advance, while another has only received 75 per cent on pre-war rates. The Government proposals seldom went much above 100 per cent, even for the lowest grades, and were substantially less in many cases.

The railwaymen refused to accept the Government's proposal, described by Sir Auckland Geddes as "definitive" and "not a basis for negotiation"; and insisted that the very least they could accept was the permanent retention of the whole of the war wage, with a higher advance where a good case could be made out. They made it clear that, in their case, less than in that of any other industry, could pre-war rates afford a reasonable basis on which to proceed to the discussion of future conditions. The railway workers were before the war certainly the worst paid of all the great classes of labor in Great Britain. This was due largely to the fact that they had long been almost unorganized, and that their great union, the National Union of Railwaymen, which has now about 450,000 members, was only formed in 1913 by a fusion of three comparatively weak societies. In 1913 and 1914, the railwaymen were actively pushing a national wages movement, and there can be no doubt that, but for the outbreak of the war, which caused them to suspend their campaign, they would have received substantial advances during the autumn of 1914. Their claim to a higher standard of living than before the war has been recognized as irrefutable both by the Prime Minister and by Mr. Bonar Law, and there can be no doubt that during the strike it commanded very wide public sympathy.

This was only one of the factors which helped to rally the other trade unions to the side of the railwaymen. But an even more potent factor was the universal feeling that the attack on the railwaymen's war wages was only the beginning of a raid upon war wages in every industry in the country. The railwaymen were the first large group of workers in any of the great war industries to get to grips with the question of post-war wage standardization, and it was universally felt that upon their success or failure in retaining war wages in full as a minimum post-war standard the fate of the workers in other

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industries would largely depend. Accordingly, the other trade unions regarded the fight of the railwaymen as their fight, and, if there had not been a speedy settlement, it is certain that other industries would soon have been involved, and that the strike would have developed into a general struggle on the wages question.

The settlement arrived at does not in so many words determine the question at issue; but in securing a definite extension of war wages until September, 1920, the railwaymen won a considerable victory, and set a precedent which the Government and the employers will be virtually compelled to follow in the case of other industries. By next September, the situation will no doubt have changed, and it is even possible that some noticeable fall in the cost of living will have taken place; but it may be regarded as certain that the determination of Labor to retain the present war wages upon a permanent basis will not have been shaken. The workers have so often been promised a new heaven and a new earth after the war that, unless other very visible and tangible signs of the new order are forthcoming, they will certainly do their best to retain what they have already won as something on account. Any attempt to reimpose pre-war conditions or to reduce wages will be resisted with the whole force of the Labor Movement, and that force is now very much more considerable than it has ever been before. The railway struggle, if it showed the perfection of the Government's preparations, and the large available supply of dukes and their hangers-on as "voluntary" or "blackleg" labor, showed also the solidarity of the railway workers, and the keen and practical sympathy of the workers in other industries with their struggle. The strong conviction that the strike had been deliberately forced by influences acting within and upon the Government, and the profound unpopularity of the two Ministers most closely concerned in it—Sir Eric and Sir Auckland Geddes —no doubt stimulated this solidarity. But at bottom the strike was, and was generally recognized as being, the opening, and perhaps the decisive battle in the post-war wages campaign.

Already, the effects of the strike are making themselves felt. The workers in the iron foundries, who were already engaged in a prolonged national strike, when the railway dispute developed, have received an offer from the employers which includes the stabilization of wages until September, 1920. This is generally regarded as indicating clearly the result of a forthcoming conference at the Ministry of Labor, which will settle the position of the industries, including engineering and shipbuilding, which are working under the Wages Temporary Regulation act. Such stabilization is, of course, very far from being the same thing as the incorporation of war advances into permanent wage-rates; but it immensely strengthens the hands of the trade unions which are asking for this. Labor has won the first round in the wages struggle, and has thereby greatly strengthened its position for the future, and increased the chances that the wages question will be settled on advantageous terms without the threatened number of sectional stoppages on a national scale.

I have dwelt in this article entirely upon the wages aspect of the recent dispute, not because it is the only aspect of importance, but because it is impossible to cover in a single article both the events of the strike itself and its underlying causes. With certain other aspects which seem likely to make it a landmark in British labor development, I am dealing separately in another article. Here I am only trying to make it clear that, whatever motives may have played a secondary part, the strike was essentially a wages strike, and the question at issue was the future level of wages, not in the railway industry alone, but in almost every industry in Great Britain. Its result has been to adminster a severe check to the attempt to reduce wages below the level which they reached during the war period.

G. D. H. Cole.

Winter Trees

The winter trees have kinship with the skies
When the pale sun of February lies
Upon the level west, and the air is cold;
Then the last chilly rays like splintered gold
Come slanting up the fields, and swift they set
A torch in every treetop,—in the net
Of naked birches, in the maple brush
A twig or two will glimmer like a rush;
And up the apple trunks a pinkness pours,
And copper lights are in the sycamores.

But soon the sunlight wanes, and sudden slips
The lovely glazing from the maple tips,
And strikes along the evening clouds and glows
In richest plummy hues and burnished rose.
And now by field and dusky wood and lane
The trees are faded down to drab again.
Only the upper branches in the sky
Reach for the colored clouds as they go by,
Tangle them in their boughs and pull them down
And wear them like a soft arboreal crown.

Christine Turner Curtis.

Age to Youth

I too, have lived in Arcady!
I too, have pressed the golden sands
Of that bright shore
Where Youth immortal lives and plans
Forever more.

Richard S. Uhrbrock.

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Starvation and Anarchy

BARBUSSE in his story of the aviator in a hospital drew a picture of modern war which deserves to live in literature with the Satires of Lucian. Cruising in the air above the trenches in France, the aviator noticed in the opposite trenches exactly similar collections of men. As he planed downwards the same sounds reached his ear, and he realized at last that French and Germans were both saying mass at the same moment, and both sending prayers and boasts, the same, but contrary, to the throne of God. An aviator, who should take a wider sweep over Central and Eastern Europe, might see no sight as strange as this, but if he were a reflective man, the sight of the Gothic spires of Poland and the Byzantine cupolas of Russia might pique his imagination. Under each of them, he might reflect, the same prayer to the same God is being intoned. In each the priest is praying for that daily bread which in these years of war and famine has become so agonizing a need. Then as he wheeled and circled in the air he would cross the guarded lines along which each of these Christian peoples shuts off the daily bread from the other. He would see the untilled fields of the Pale, whence the Cossacks drove the cultivators in 1915, and note that the black earth zone of Ukrainia is unemployed, while the troops of Denikin, Pettlura and Trotsky chased each other across its latent riches. As he flew back across the Gulf of Finland he would observe the smoke of British cruisers engaged in blockading the starving city of Petrograd, and he might notice them speeding towards Stettin to reinforce the blockade on Germany. On those same cruisers, too, he might observe the crews gathering for prayers, and they too, he would recollect, were repeating the same petition for daily bread, the same prayer for the millennium, the same professions of mutual forgiveness.

As he came to earth again from his cruise over hungry Europe and its blockades, he might glance at his daily paper. He would there read that the Supreme Council of these Christian nations had just despatched two notes to Berlin in one of which it threatened the renewal of the blockade of Germany, while in the other it invited the Germans to join in blockading Russia. This then, he would muse, is our international life, and he would feel that he had witnessed the League of Nations in action. On a summary view, he might be tempted to conclude, that it is an august institution for the organization of famine on the Continental scale. Would he seriously err? It was not of this that the Liberal mind dreamed when first it saw this vision. We have come to this by degrees.

The foible of the Liberal mind in speculation is to depreciate the factor of force in human affairs: its weakness in action is to calculate without it. From the early eighteenth century, when Liberal theory built society on the basis of contract, down to Lincoln's monumental aphorism about government by the consent of the governed, progressives have struggled to turn their backs upon the realities of power. Themselves reluctant, save in the last resort, to coerce men's wills by force, their tendency has been to turn a blind eye to its workings in the world. History they sought to interpret as a "Divine tactic" in which ideas governed the movement of events. On the eve of the war the influence of a long peace had so accentuated this tendency that the average Liberal thinker, at all events in insular England, had come to think of armies and fleets as grotesque survivals of a more primitive age, as irrelevant as some primeval mammoth which should stray by chance into a farmer's stock-yard. The war ought to have shaked us all into realism. It did nothing of the kind. On the contrary, the Liberal contempt for force only asserted itself with a more passionate assurance. It wove a pathetic ideology around "the war to end war," and it seriously believed that with "the Destruction of Prussian militarism" the reign of ideas would begin. The League of Nations would have been a sane work of creative idealism, only if it had started its career with a Europe liberated by an ideally just settlement, from every clamant motive for strife. In point of fact, the urgent grievances, the irrepressible causes of unrest are immensely more numerous and more intolerable than they were in the Europe of 1914. The inhibitions of custom which helped to keep the peace have lost their influence. Men have rediscovered what the savage knows, that it is remarkably easy to kill, and statesmen issue their orders to blockade whole populations with as little scruple as a judge will issue his injunction against a debtor. More than half of the Old World is today in a state of fantastic chaos and misery, which recalls the more lurid pages of Candide. The spectacle disturbs us but moderately, and our rulers still sign their orders for mass starvation, "between their dinners and their prayers."

What has really happened to the world is that the old balance of power under which we had lived

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for a century has been shattered beyond repair. Germany is disarmed, while Austria and Russia have fallen in pieces. From the standpoint of authority this might be tolerable, if the one strong surviving military power of the Continent, were able to dominate it, as, for example, Napoleon did. The resources of France are not equal to the task. Though a frank militarism is in office under M. Clemenceau, though Marshal Foch still wields the supreme Allied command, though the French army has on paper a preponderance such as no single army has possessed in Europe since the peace of Tilsit, the real power of France is pitiably restricted. With a million and a half of her poilus under the sod, and the survivors ready to mutiny at the suggestion of any further active service, she cannot act effectively beyond her frontiers. The schemes of her rulers contemplated the enlistment of Poles, Czechs, Rumanians and South Slavs as her armed satellites, but allies, each imbued with a mad nationalist megalomania, are a difficult team to drive. Napoleon would have set his brothers on their thrones: no other plan is really workable, if the aim be discipline and ascendancy. The aspect of Europe answers the prediction which some of us made when the Allies resolved on the dismemberment of Austria, and mishandled Russia till she broke! A Balkanized Europe would be tolerable, only if the League of Nations were what it will not be, a firm, nay, omnipotent central authority.

The entire history of the Peace Conference was a demonstration that in the present state of the world this central authority cannot be created. To ask whether Mr. Wilson could have done it, if he had been a stronger man, is like a speculation on the length of Cleopatra's nose. His failure had this significance, that with it we lost the hope that the disinterested judgment of the civilized conscience might prevail over national egoisms. The national egoisms won all along the line, from the Saar Valley to Shantung. What we are witnessing today in Riga, in Fiume and in Budapest, is merely the first dramatic proof that the battle for moral authority was lost in the Hotel Crillon. It happens that of the statesmen who affect to control Europe from Paris, one only, M. Clemenceau, is a man of action, and he has no faith in the League. The Council, however, could have wielded world-wide authority only if it had steadily, honestly and publicly attempted to lead opinion by an appeal to universal standards of morality. That duty it disdained from the first. Its moral authority is now irrecoverable. Everyone knows that it will always end by accepting accomplished facts. When Poland disobeyed it by using Haller's army to conquer Eastern Galicia, it ended by giving that province in perpetual possession to the Poles. It will do the same thing at Fiume, and the event will show that D'Annunzio understood his world. The Rumanians are still in Hungary, and their usurpation, the most scandalous because the most brutal of the series, will assuredly be no less profitable than the other cases. The new dispersal of power, is in short, infinitely more anarchic and no nearer to any democratic ideal of self-determination, than the old balance of power, which three emperors used to manipulate.

The most recent case of this series is by far the most instructive. By all the principles of Wilsonism or Liberalism, it was among the first duties of the League of Nations, and in the meantime of the Allies, to secure the independence and "Self-determination" of the Baltic States. Was it not precisely their hard case which seemed to justify the prolongation of the war, after the peace of Brest-Litovsk? They had to be protected against the Bolsheviki on one side, and the possible renaissance of German imperialism on the other. The Allies, so far from protecting them, have introduced every conceivable aggravation into their lot. Thanks to the Allies it is not two but three dangers which now confront them. Firstly, it was the Allies, who at the armistice insisted that the German army should not evacuate these provinces: it was positively ordered to remain as its post to ward off Bolshevik attacks. Secondly, it was the Allies who selected Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenitch as the leaders of "loyal" Russia. These soldiers revived the integral ambitions of Tsardom. They will not recognize the independence of these Baltic States, and the Allies, strangely enough, bow to the refusal of men who would be beggared émigrés, were it not for their subsidies from London. The result was that the Baltic States, unwilling to be reabsorbed in an Imperial Russia, desisted from the war upon the Soviets, brought about the failure of the attack on Petrograd, and at length prepared to make their peace with Moscow. Tsardom was left without an army. The working-classes in England and France are just strong enough, as Mr. Churchill has learned to his cost, to prevent the direct employment of western troops in Russia. Mannerheim has paid by an ignominious defeat in his candidature for the presidency of Finland, for the horrors of his "White" terror. In spite of the rigid English blockade, a striking force was still necessary to capture Petrograd. Where failing Esthonians and Finns and British infantry, was the Russian reaction to find it? Inevitably it turned to that German legion the Allies had providently left in Courland.

The real intentions of von der Golz and his little

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army were already angrily debated in Berlin, while I was there this spring. Were they waiting there as a nucleus force for a military coup d'état in Germany itself, or as a force to resist Polish annexations? It is possible that both these plans floated in the minds of the leaders. Their ranks were recruited by the working of much simpler considerations. Like the Free Corps with which Noske crushed the Spartacists at home, they were filled with sturdy young men, who realized that in a half-starved and workless Germany, only a man in uniform could be sure of ample rations. The officers like the men were unemployed, and the Versailles Treaty had closed their career for them. In addition, they were promised land for settlement in the Baltic Provinces, and they saw beckoning them a congenial Junker's existence, in a country whose culture has always been German. I do not myself believe that the Berlin government took the initiative in any far-reaching political scheme. Since it had created these mercenary corps to insure itself against Communism, it had to humor them in many things. It ruled on sufferance, and had to tolerate much in their methods which it dreaded. It could not control them even at home. Out in the No Man's Land of the Baltic Provinces, its writ did not run. To be sure, von der Golz has obtained arms from home. Even that does not necessarily convict the civilian government of Berlin of complicity in his aims, for the arsenals at home are under the control of the home army which is a law unto itself. The Junker chiefs of that army obey a semi-Socialist Ministry, no further than it suits them.

In this Russian-German question, we come upon a fresh phase, and perhaps the most significant phase, of the anarchy in Europe. The class war which hunger has sharpened smoulders beneath it, and everywhere the precarious social balance of power is reflected in the feebleness of the central authority. Why may Italian nationalism do as it pleases in Fiume? Largely because if it were repressed and discredited, a Socialist revolution might break out in Italy. Why is M. Paderewski humored? Largely because even in Poland, communism is gaining ground. Why are the Rumanians tolerated in Hungary? Again because the social revolution there is still a latent force. Inevitably the German military reaction and Russian Tsarism have come together, and asserted the identity of their propertied interests against the feeble peasant nationalism of the Baltic farmers. The Supreme Council's expedient of renewing the starvation of Germany, by way of punishing the adventure of von der Golz, will attain no result whatever, save indeed to foster the German revolution, and to add number of German children who will grow up rickety and deformed. The German freebooters who are making a career with their swords, will care no more for the misery of Berlin behind them, than Kolchak and his followers care for the sufferings of Moscow. Pity has fled from our brutalized continent. The question to be decided in the immediate future is simply, whether Russia, thanks to the Red army, will retain her Socialist system, or whether Tsarism in alliance with foreign capitalism can be restored. Which brand of foreign capitalism wins the race, depends on the comparative utility to Kolchak of a German striking force on the one hand, and of British subsidies and tanks on the other. The anarchy is working out to its own cure. An allied Russo-German imperialism might promise stability of a kind. A Russo-British imperialism would also be a solution, though a much less natural, less familiar and less workable combination. The third of the conceivable solutions, a victory for the Soviet system, would offer the principle of authority based on an idea, which liberalism conceived and failed to realize, but it too, like the others can establish itself only by force.

It is easy on paper to sketch out these alternatives. The event will probably be less logical, less schematic. The struggle to find some authority in this atomized, disintegrated Europe may conceivably reach no early solution whatever. The one means of discipline which the Supreme Council retains and uses, the power of the blockade is a weapon not so much against the lawless as against society itself. It is the begetter of revolutions, and it leaves the nation which suffers under it, a cyclone area of contending passions. Out of hunger nc controlling authority can emerge and even if the submission of Russia should one day be as abjec as that of Hungary, we should be no nearer to an stable reconstruction of her life. The idea of in ternational government would in any hands hav been a nightmare vision of oppression, unless i based itself rather on its power to confer benefit than on its ability to coerce, rather on a conceptio of impartial justice than on the rule of a victoriou faction. It is creating no court. The weak are nc heard. The unpopular cannot plead their cas Attempt there is none to distribute the world's foo and raw materials according to need. It combine brutality with weakness, and exhibits its authori only in the unmatched efficiency of its organizatic of hunger. A tyranny may justify itself if it obeyed. But the Supreme Council does not mal itself obeyed. That this institution, with this trac tion and with these personalities at its head, shou melt insensibly into the League of Nations is tl sharpest rebuke in history to liberal illusions.

H. N. Brailsford.

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A Class Policy in Coal

THE President wrote one of the first sentences in the present chapter of the class policy in coal—last year. It was on November 15th. A few days later he was to make his unforgettable speech to Congress in which he would dwell on the famous idea that "re-construction"—or, more contemptuously, "re-adjustment"—was a thing to be left to the unfettered sagacity of the American business man. But on November 15th he was talking to miners. What he said to them was never much noted by the general public; but by the miners it was cherished in strict memory.

They had asked him for a raise. He said he could not let them have it. He alluded to "stabilized" wages admiringly. The miners could do a great deal for the "stabilization" of wages if they would only show a "firm adherence to the agreement made with me last year,"—1917. He added sympathetically:

"I am satisfied that only by pursuing this course will we escape the unfortunate results which otherwise and at other times have characterized the change from war to peace—a process which, unregulated, would press with greatest severity on Labor."

So Labor, in order to escape that severity, would continue to have its wages in coal mines "regulated" by the war-time agreement of 1917. But, again, Labor, in order to again escape that severity, would see Capital, in the President's speech of the following month, putting off its war-time chains and soaring about in free sagacity.

Most class-consciousness is unconscious. Perhaps the President's was. In any case the philosophy he announced was thoroughly class-conscious and also thoroughly in harmony with his international views. It was a sort of domestic rendition of a League-of-Nations Imperialism: Self-Determination for capitalistic groups; Intervention and Strong Government for proletarian groups.

Still, the question of the affinity between wages and prices, between wages kept reasonable and prices therefore kept reasonable, was full of interest. What were the prices of coal in the days of its freedom, before the Fuel Administration was born?

I put that question to Mr. Searles, Editor of the Journal of the United Mine Workers. He was sitting at his desk in the Headquarters of the United Mine Workers at Indianapolis. I asked him if he would be good enough to let me consult the price-records and wage-records in his files.

He said he was sorry. He said that Judge Anderson was a high-grade judge. He said that he stood in no fear of Judge Anderson, as long as he obeyed Judge Anderson's injunction. He said that he would stand in great fear of him if he should in any way disobey it. So he must decline to give me the information I requested, or any other information. I asked him if I might carry off a copy of the United Mine Workers Journal I saw on his desk. He said no.

He was firm but pleasant. I returned to suggest that possibly Judge Anderson would not mind—and in fact might think it the act of a good citizen—if he would let me see the injunction. Mr. Searles reached into an inner pocket, just over his heart, and drew the injunction out.

It did indeed enjoin Mr. Lewis and Mr. Green and some eighty others to desist from many things, and among them was: "issuing any messages of encouragement or exhortation to striking miners."

"If I should give you some information, and if you should print it, and if a miner should read it," said Mr. Searles, "it might be taken to be encouraging or exhorting him."

I congratulated Mr. Searles sincerely on his wisdom and went back to my hotel and solaced myself with a book. I was glad I had brought some good reading along with me. It is a book entitled "Prices of Coal and Coke 1913-1918," by that victorious assembler of war coal data and of all coal data—Mr. C. E. Lesher of the Geological Survey.

Take the average actual prices of all bituminous coal from July of 1913 to June of 1914, and let them be represented by the figure "100." Then the average actual prices of all bituminous coal in June of 1917 (just before regulation) will stand at 210. A rise.

Then take wages. I had thoughtfully brought my notes of certain coal-wage agreements with me to the city of coal-wage agreements. From 1914 to June of 1917, in the Central Competitive Field, the wage of the pick-miners rose, and the wage of the machine-miners rose. They rose. They rose about 15 per cent for the pick-miners and about 26 per cent for the machine-miners.

For prices, a rise of 110 per cent. For the wages of three-quarters of the wage earners, a rise of 15 and 26. The miners knew it. That was one of the reasons why they asked for a raise in the fall of 1914. They thought that the operators might have some of that money left.

But Mr. Wilson was not thinking of the past.

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He was pointing to a better period of time—the future. He said in effect that if the miners would only stay stabilized, the future would somehow be more or less on its way to being a regulated process.

His Railroad Administration then took up the burden of proof. It proved Mr. Wilson quite wrong. It zealously de-regulated the coal industry at point and point and point. During the war it had been obliged to buy its coal at regularized prices. Now, not knowing that the war was still on for the miners, it went out at many points to buy its coal at specialized prices. It could use its vast power as big buyer. It could use its vast power as controller of coal cars. It used these powers. That is, it permitted certain railroad officials to use them. The National Coal Association (of operators) complained. The United Mine Workers complained. The railroads, in 1918, just as if it were peace-time, were sapping the proper revenue of the coal industry by extorting specialized low prices from it, and they were creating excess unemployment and hardship in certain areas by shifting contracts from those areas to other areas in pursuit of individual economy and in defiance of social war-time rules of distribution.

The miners had adhered to regulated wages. The railroads had struck against regulated prices. The miners were compelled to grow poorer through irregularity of work. The railroads were permitted to pick up new dollars by changing to new contracts. The perfidy of this procedure is invisible to the class-conscious eye.

The miners and the operators said that specialized prices for railroads might result in specialized prices—specialized the other way—for some ordinary consumers. Perhaps they were right. In Indiana the Fuel Administration's war-time price for "prepared sizes" of bituminous coal was $2.60. In the last reported week of October of this year the prices of "prepared sizes" of bituminous coal in Indiana, by districts (averaged) were $2.79, $2.80, $2.89, $2.92, and $3.18.

By September of this year the miners were totally and immovably convinced that the war was over for all owners, buyers, sellers, jobbers, agents, investors, mortgagees, mortgagors, and other capitalists of any sort in, near, on, or around the coal industry. They went to their September Convention determined to have it over also for the diggers.

They carried with them a sustaining recollection of their demonstrated loyalty to the American cause in the Great War. Their subscriptions to Liberty Bonds and to War Savings Stamps, through their locals and their national headquarters, excluding all subscriptions by individuals and counting only subscriptions by the organization itself, amounted to almost $10,000,000.00. On the wall of the office of Acting President Lewis in Indianapolis, one still sees a certain picture surviving to preserve the memory of last year. It displays and urges the duty of the miner in the war. It shows him buying Liberty Bonds and buying War Savings Stamps and growing food in the name of Hoover in war gardens and laboring in the fields to bring in farm-crops at night and digging coal; and it shows a red line of coal production lifted to new peaks by this patriotic steadiness. Mr. Lewis does not forget the war. His first remark from the chair at the Cleveland Convention was that the United Mine Workers should remember first the miners who went to France and died and should "give the full meed of honor to those sterling patriots who gave their all that our democratic institutions might endure."

They are patriotic, these "radicals," Mr. Lewis and his associates in office, and how they are against radicalism! How they are against all radical labor organizations! If employers think that One Big Union is a bad idea, Mr. Lewis agrees with them, and in their own language. Recounting the combat between the United Mine Workers and the One Big Union in Western Canada, Mr. Lewis analyzed the One Big Union's promoters and principles in the following phrases:

"Misguided enthusiasts," "Mercenary enemies," "Fantastical ideas," "Day dreams by visionaries."

No one-hundred-per-cent-per-annum American could have been more anti-Bolshevik.

Sufficiently anti-Bolshevik, too, was the official reporter of the convention from national headquarters. A delegate from Indiana spoke against the support given to Kolchak by American troops in Siberia. He claimed that Kolchak was a "too of Imperialism." The official reporter commented "This remark was applauded by the sympathizer with the Bolshevik Government." For the officia reporter an opposition to Kolchak was a sympath with Bolsheviks.

At its official levels the Cleveland Conventio seemed for a while to regard Mr. Wilson's war i Siberia as a good war; and it certainly did regar Mr. Wilson's League of Nations as a good Leagu It was loyal. Its official Resolutions Committe brought in a resolution stringently advising th United States Senate to stop making up its ow mind about the League of Nations and to ado Mr. Wilson's Covenant of it without amendme and without delay. But there the new currents u der the official levels began to heave.

Opponents rose up against the League of N tions. They seemed to belong, said the official r

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porter, to the "radical element"—a disparaging phrase. They were noisy. But they were also numerous. They took the sort of anti-Bolshevism wanted by the governments of the world and spread it before the eyes of rank-and-file delegates who did not know Washington very well but who had quite well enough perceived the color of present governmental character by watching the results of present governmental coal-policies in their own towns and households. There were motions and votes.

A resolution was moved maintaining the right of the people of Russia to work out their *own* destiny by establishing for *themselves* their *own* system of government. It was passed. And a resolution was moved to put the whole subject of the League of Nations on the table. Mr. William Green, a high official, Secretary-Treasurer of the whole international union, rose to defend the League of Nations. He defended it ably, but he was over-borne. The motion to put the League of Nations where it could do no harm was made by the same delegate who had called Kolchak a "tool of Imperialism." It was carried. The League was tabled, shelved.

It was a radical defeat for Wilsonian governmental internationalism in a body of men whose chief officers are dominantly, distinctively governmental, conservative. It was a radical answer to a class-policy in war in Siberia and in coal in America. The Government's rejoinder was more class-policy.

The convention sent a "scale committee" to "negotiate" a new wage-scale with the operators. Note well:

The ultimatum by the convention was not a thirty-hour week and a 60 per cent advance in wages. The ultimatum was a "negotiation" and a "satisfactory contract" by November 1. Note well again:

The demand for a new contract was now a year old. Mr. Wilson had written his stabilization and regulation letter about it in November of 1918. Mr. Garfield, as Fuel Administrator, had written a letter about it in the previous September.

This demand now passed through two negative conferences of operators and arrived again in Washington. The Government assumed a mask of Americanism, of nationalism, of neutrality. It had long ago turned the mining industry back from being a nationally ordered business to being a privately plundered scramble. It now declared that it was the father and mother and watchful loving guardian of the mining industry and that the miners were impudent and disloyal to think of scrambling in it. It had permitted its own Railroad Administration to tap the pockets of the mining industry by secret economic force. It now professed to be shocked to think that the miners would dream of tapping its pockets by open economic force. It had made no effort since the armistice to prevent a strike and a stoppage of coal by giving the mining industry a peace-time national organization capable of compensating the miners justly for work publicly essential. It now proposed to prevent the strike and the stoppage of coal by forbidding the miners to act against the industry and the public. It had not seen to it that the situation—the situation in an industry of national and public and government concern—was just. It now magnificently demanded that the toad beneath the harrow in that situation should be just. And above all—above all:

After having failed to move one inch anywhere to shorten the year-long struggle of the miners for a wage consistent with new living-costs, it now threatened at Washington to go to any length to actually protract that struggle into the coming winter by compelling the miners to submit to the longest known form of settlement—and the most treacherous one—a form packed with a neutral usually from unneutral circles—"arbitration."

When the miners persisted in demanding simple direct "negotiation" with their employers—"negotiation without reservations," and when, not getting it, they started their strike, the Government was very indignant. It could have prevented the strike altogether by compelling the operators to accept "negotiation without reservations." It could have compelled the operators to accept "negotiation without reservations" by threatening to take over the operation of their mines. "Negotiation" is the custom of the industry. The Government apparently could not think of trying to compel the operators to accept the custom of the industry. It had to think of trying to compel the miners to accept a loaded novelty.

Then it had one final great thought for spreading radicalism among miners. With its little injunction it chopped off the conservative supreme leadership of the United Mine Workers from contact with the rank-and-file. Lewis the patriot, Green the defender of a governmental League of Nations, Searles the publisher of editorial pages teeming with rebukes to "fads" and "isms"—such men it sequestered. It will not, it cannot, sequester whatever radicalism there may be in the hundreds of thousands of men in the rank-and-file. That radicalism, the extreme part of it, may appreciate the temporary absence of official restraint and may feel quite indebted to Mr. Palmer.

In fact all persons who want to see the re-organization of America accomplished class-consciously ought to be indebted to the whole Government.

I submit:

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The diplomatic recognition of the capitalistic Terror Government in Finland, considered in the light of the refusal of recognition to the proletarian Terror Government in Russia, was our historic declaration of the class-war abroad. The injunction against the miners, considered in the light of the whole course of coal-affairs since the armistice, is our historic declaration of the class-war at home. The next great historic American is the one who can do the acts that will counter-act those declarations.

WILLIAM HARD.

Parliament and the Taxpayer

Parliament and the Taxpayer, by E. H. Davenport. London: Skeffington and Son.

WE have become so accustomed to regard the English budget-system as the zenith of parliamentary achievement, that an analysis of its deficiencies comes with a certain sobering emphasis. The value of the budget as an administrative instrument is not, of course, in question. If it did no more than prevent the growth of an English pork-barrel it would deserve not a little of the eulogies bestowed upon it. Yet we too little recognise that, after all, a financial system depends upon more complex factors than the mere technique of statement. Its value presupposes an alert deliberative assembly which can pass, if not an expert, at least a careful judgment, upon the items of an estimate. It presupposes that the estimates themselves are drawn up in such a fashion as to enable not mere scrutiny of each item in terms of cost, but also a method whereby the skill of government administration relative to the world of business may be tested. The standard English method was a certain treasury control over the other departments of government; together with a comptroller-general whose visé was necessary to all expenditure, and a House of Commons committee which scrutinized accounts.

It was evident for some time before the war that the system was not working with the care that theory demanded. The rigidity of the Treasury was notably relaxed under Mr. Lloyd-George's tenure of the Exchequer. The comptroller-general can pass upon the legality of expenditure but he has no power to offer criticism upon its wisdom. The House Committee on Accounts does valuable work thoroughly well; but the pressure of other parliamentary business upon its members must always mean in practice not only that it is from one to two years late in its examinations, but also that each scrutiny must be confined to one or other of the great spending departments, and cannot extend to the work of the government as a whole. Here were sufficient materials for a catastrophe which the war inevitably precipitated. For what it did was to necessitate immense votes of credit without knowledge or investigation upon the part of the House of Commons as to whether the money was needed, or whether, even if needed, it was wisely spent. A vote of credit, in fact, became a vote of confidence; and on a matter of expenditure few members were audacious enough to challenge the security of government in wartime.

The House of Commons is yet possessed of a simple but efficient reserve power for such a purpose; and in 1917 it appointed, under the presidency of Mr. Herbert Samuel, a Select Committee to inquire into the problem, as a whole, of National Expenditure. Mr. Davenport was the secretary of that portion of the Committee which dealt with the finances of the British War Office. His book is a skillful popularization of the reports of the Committee, written, apparently, from a complete knowledge of the situation; and he has added to this summary an historical account of the attempts on the part of Parliament, since the later Plantagenets, to control expenditure in the interest of the taxpayer. This portion of the book, indeed, is not very satisfactory. It bears the marks of haste; and it has not a little of the too facile habit of idealizing past efforts at control, merely because they are the efforts of the past. The Rolls of Parliament are too full of bitter complaint to make us feel that the system of parliamentary commissioners was ever very valuable; and after the Revolution English finance was a kind of poor law system for the aristocratic families. It is when he comes to the age of Gladstone that Mr. Davenport's account becomes really informative and valuable; and no student of administrative mechanics can afford to neglect it. It were greatly to be hoped that the paramount importance of the subject will lead some American publisher to print at least this portion of the book. There is no point here without some lesson for those who are interested in financial reform.

What, broadly, has been revealed in the last two years is the complete inadequacy of the House of Commons as a financial instrument. It cannot debate the proposals of ministers; partly because it is not interested in them, but more particularly because the form in which they are presented renders a genuine opinion upon their substance impossible. What members really debate is not the estimates, but the policy which those estimates represent; and even here the knowledge that too spirited an opposition may entail a government defeat naturally renders worthless no small part of the criticism offered. The House of Commons, in fact, is impotent because it is ignorant. It has nothing save the information each minister may choose to proffer; and, obviously enough, no minister will proffer information which he perceives to be disadvantageous to himself. That, at least, is not the least striking of the facts discovered by the Select Committee. Bad accounts, overstaffing of departments, stupid contracts, narrow departmentalism, are discoveries which, in such generality of statement, really serve rather to gloss over the blunders they conceal than to set them in true perspective. English finance, in fact, is today so much the creature of the executive power that the House of Commons has virtually lost the office of guardianship which was once the main source of its influence.

It was thus the restoration of parliamentary prestige which became the main object of the Committee's enquiries; and Mr. Davenport's own studies and experience lead him to an eager endorsement of their conclusions. They urge, in the first place, the most sweeping changes in departmental estimates and accounts. Broadly they want the substitution of cost accounting in terms of individual items for the present announcement of lump sums; and the forms suggested by the Committee—the work of Sir Charles Harris of the War Office—have certainly an infinite superiority to anything we have had in the past. But when the estimates can be understood the next thing is to understand them; and the Committee therefore urges the establishment of two standing Committees of the House of Commons, which, aided by a staff of experts, shall report on the annual estimates to the House before the latter is

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asked to pass them. Here, of course, the main difficulty is lest the government and the standing committee collide; for, in that event, any recommendation hostile to the ministry becomes in fact a vote of confidence. It is therefore suggested that motions to reduce estimates, where they do not touch upon the fundamentals of policy, should be judged as at no point entailing censure on the government. Mr. Davenport himself adds the suggestion that the financial procedure of the House should be revised with a view to the saving of parliamentary time.

These, it is clear enough, are far-reaching proposals; and it is worth while briefly to indicate something of what they involve. The devolution of great power to a standing committee is something of which the House of Commons has always been most jealous. Here, indeed, it can be shown that without it the present overwhelming power of the executive must be maintained; and that constitutes the great argument for its retention. But how is the committee to be constituted? Is the government of the day to be in a majority thereon? Are the whips to release individual members from their general duty of supporting their party? The Report, and Mr. Davenport, are silent upon these points, though they are vital to its substance. Here, also, it may be remarked, lies the necessity of ample debate in the House as a whole; for if Mr. Davenport had had experience of American conditions he would have seen the danger of giving to a committee financial power which in theory is the possession of a whole assembly. Once that is done, the inevitable tendency is for the committee to usurp facilities and to leave the House its inert subject. And in England, where the executive is the fundamental keystone of the legislative arch, there is real danger lest the compression of debate lead a minister who is in difficulties with a standing committee to appeal to the House's jealously guarded sense of its own rights for relief. Nor has Mr. Davenport explained in what precise fashion fundamental policy is to be separated from incidental expenditure. Is an admiralty recommendation of three capital ships fundamental policy? Is the reconstruction of the army hospital system incidental expenditure? Lord Herbert of Lea would stoutly have fought the latter plea; and when Mr. McKenna was at the Admiralty the exact number of Dreadnoughts was the main pivot of debate. Clearly enough, if the Committee's duties are to be narrowed to the study only of items of cost, except for a handful of members, it will be hardly less difficult than now to arouse widespread interest in detail among members of Parliament.

Yet the large problem remains; and no one can read the report of the Select Committee, or even its summary in Mr. Davenport's book, without a sense of how substantial a contribution it has made to what is not the least urgent issue of the time. Americans ought to have a special interest in these studies. The system of finance in the United States is likely, in the next decade, to undergo a much needed revision. The tendency at the present time is to regard a Budget as the relief from the manifold ills of congressional interpolation. That is a profound mistake. The real problem is for America to make up its mind whether the real center of control is to remain with congressional committees or in their direction by the executive mind. What congressional committees can do, a study of the relationship of Senators Smoot and Warren to the Tariff Commission has recently revealed; and therein its inadequacies are patent. Executive control is impossible while the separation of powers remains. What at least emerges is the need for a complete investigation into the roots of representative government in America. It would be interesting to find whether, on such enquiry, the system was either representative or government.

H. J. L.

India's Silent Revolution

India's Silent Revolution, by F. B. Fisher. New York: The Macmillan Co.

THE name of this book raises the old question as to the exact definition of a revolution. In popular parlance it connotes the idea of a fundamental and sudden change in the government of a country. The Government of India has not yet been subjected to any such change and there is no prospect of any such change taking place in India in the near future. The name of the book is thus a misnomer. Revolutions never develop silently. Whatever elements of revolutionary change are present in India today are by no means silent.

The most important feature of Mr. Fisher's book is a plea for India's right to an extension of representative government on the ground that, though geographically she is in Asia, racially, culturally and by linguistic ties she is part and parcel of Aryan Europe. "Shall India," he asks, "follow the trend of her racial ties . . . or shall she cross to the divide and throw in her three hundred millions with all their man power and resources, to become a true Asian among Asiatics?" The British Parliament, he thinks, "holds the decision of this question in the dim and mysterious recesses of its gloomy halls . . . where reports of vital import are sometimes shelved and tabled and committed until the time of action has passed." India stands waiting to learn what England is going to do for her. The Government of India has in the meantime replied by the enactment of Rowlatt Acts and by the use of bombs, machine guns, and aeroplanes for the preservation of order. Moderate appreciation of Mr. Montagu's reform scheme has been rewarded by wholesale arrests and deportations of political leaders in the Punjab and public flogging and court martialling of their followers. The Punjab has now been under military law for about three months and during this time the people had a veritable reproduction of a Tsarist regime there. The Government of India's final dispatch of the Constitutional reforms is another indication of the same mind. The original scheme as enunciated during the war has been modified in important particulars with a view to maintaining the supremacy of the bureaucracy. The need for conciliation is over, and Imperialism is again asserting itself in its shameless nakedness.

In the chapter on Fields and Factories Mr. Fisher quotes some remarkable Anglo-Indian testimonials about the grinding poverty of the Indian masses, though in his judgment "India's poverty and her ill-adjusted economic organization should not necessarily be interpreted as an indictment of the British government in India," a remark which shows deplorable lack of understanding of the true functions of a government and its economic policy. If he had waited a few more months he might not have been in a position to say that the "colossal suffering from general famines is *at least* diminishing and *perhaps* it is a thing of the past." (The italics are ours). It is sufficient to condemn a government to declare that "the life-long torment of bitter poverty and chronic hunger is widespread." Mr. Fisher's statement that the average annual income of an Indian is $20.00 is obviously wrong. It may be a typo-

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graphical error for $10.00, though it is repeated several times.

There is hardly anything new and illuminating in the observations on caste and the position of women. The author notes the changes that are taking place in the views of Indians on the social questions and it is probably the slow progress in social reform which has tempted him to designate the process of change as "silent revolution." India is changing, and considering the area and the numbers involved and the handicap of a foreign rule, conducted more in the interests of the ruling nation than of the people of India, the change is by no means slow. The political awakening of the country which has been so rapid in the last two decades has reacted wonderfully and considerably on the social outlook of the people. Young India is discussing the social problem with a full knowledge of the modern thought relating thereto, though she is by no means in a hurry to adopt the moral standards of the West, which are themselves undergoing a process of analytic destruction even in their native home. It is time that the foreign students of the Indian civilization cease to indulge in criticisms and denunciations based on the assumptions of the moral superiority of Christian theology. Christian theology and Christian morality are both in the melting pot and wise men will not be positive about their future. A tremendous change has taken place in the social outlook in India on account of the war. Hindus and Mohammedans have sunk their differences; women have joined in the political struggle and have been taking active part and interest in political and industrial organizations; the depressed classes have become self-conscious and are aggressively asserting themselves; and last, but not least, labor is organizing and is assimilating Western trade union methods of improving its condition.

The book bristles with generalizations and hearsay statements which are dangerously vague with reference to a country of the size and area of India, though made with the best of intentions and with scrupulous anxiety to speak the truth.

Speaking of the economic vagaries of caste, Mr. Fisher seems to ignore the economic inequalities of the West. A man living in a glass house is not wise in throwing stones at other people's windows. Some very noted economic writers of England have begun to see the good points of the Hindu caste system. Its worst features, its rigidity and immutability, are however, universally condemned in India. Caste as a religious-social institution is doomed. But as an industrial organization it might be considerably modified somewhat on Western lines.

In several respects Mr. Fisher's book is a refreshing reminder to the Western world that the problem of India is going to receive more and more attention every day.

LAJPAT RAI.

Publicity for the Classics

The Relation of Latin to Practical Life, by Francis Ellis Sabin, Madison, Wis.: Published by the Author.

FOR the violet to be modest in this age is little short of immorality. It is to deceive the public into believing that there is no worth and no fragrance in her. Let her bray her claims with a brass band, or become extinct, in an age in which "publicity" is potent enough to impose upon us bouquets and boutonnieres of skunk cabbage, if only it tried. Amid the strident claims of other educational wares the calm, sweet voice of the ancient classics had of late become all but inaudible. That was a grave misfortune. There would still be plenty of buyers for the classic wares, if they were but displayed properly.

Do you know how much a training in Latin helps you to understand the English language? Do you realize that Latin is not a dead language at all, but lives vigorously in French, Spanish, Italian, Rumanian, which have wandered no farther from the speech of Plautus and Horace than our own English has wandered from the speech of Chaucer and Langland? Are you fully aware of the dependence of our philosophic, scientific and technological terminology upon Latin and Greek? Have you an adequate conception of the fact that an overwhelming proportion of the intellectual and artistic elements which compose what you call civilization have been lifted bodily from Greece and Rome, and that an intimate acquaintance with those elements in their original purity makes the contemporary world much more intelligible? Latin and Greek are keys, skeleton keys, that open an incredible number of treasure chests. If you do not believe this, examine Professor Sabin's little book: it will open your eyes. And even if you do believe it, you will find a curious interest in Professor Sabin's method of setting the case for Latin before those who do not know what Latin instruction may mean and are therefore vehemently opposed to it. You will be surprised to see how the cause of Latin instruction can be made to appeal to the eye, with graphs and percentages, cartoons and posters. With such publicity any passably consumable ware on the market ought to sell.

And yet, when you close the book, you will find yourself commenting: This is a case for Latin: it is a vivid case, but somehow the essence has escaped. That is not the fault of Professor Sabin, but the fault of the publicity method. All the publicity experts, you know, might unite to sing the praises of the violet, but the real virtues of the violet would remain unsung. It is impossible to define exactly what that is, just as it is impossible to define what it is that takes place in your soul in Latin study when the mist of language first lifts and you begin to gain a clear view of the valiant and brilliant figures of Rome and Greece, much more alive than the groups you pass as you walk down the street. That affects your imagination just as would a sudden clairvoyance that enabled you to look down through the gray opacity of the sea's choppy surface to the tranquil depths, thousands of fathoms below. After that you would feel more at home on the sea, would you not? So, by aid of the classics you have made yourself more at home in life. That is something that all men desire; but you can not use it for window dressing.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

Contributors

RALPH ALBERTSON spent a year in Russia as Y. M. C. A. secretary, the bulk of the time at the front with the American troops. He was decorated for gallantry by the Russian government and cited by the British command.

G. D. H. COLE is the author of Labor in Wartime, Self Government in Industry and Labor in the Commonwealth.

H. N. BRAILSFORD has done considerable work in the Balkans as a newspaper correspondent. He is the author of The War of Steel and Gold, and A League of Nations.

WILLIAM HARD is a regular contributor to the New Republic.

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